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The End of the Anecdotes Tradition of Early China 
Paul van Els* 
Anecdotes were of paramount importance in the written culture of early China, the period from 
the Zhou Dynasty  (ca. 1045-256 BCE) to the former half of the Han Dynasty  (202 BCE-
220 CE). The short, freestanding accounts of particular events—“true” or invented—in Chinese 
history occur in large quantities in a wide range of texts and genres.1 Most texts contain at least a 
few anecdotes, while some texts consist almost entirely of anecdotes. Several early Chinese 
anecdotes feature unnamed protagonists that are vaguely identified as “someone who was 
plowing the fields” (geng tian zhe ), “someone who waded through a river in winter” 
(dong she shui zhe ), and so on, with the name of the state where they hailed from 
casually (and possibly fictitiously) added to give readers at least some background of these 
persons. The vast majority of early Chinese anecdotes, by contrast, feature actual historical 
people mentioned by name, such as famous rulers, noblemen, statesmen, archers, officers, 
inventors, philosophers, teachers, recluses, cooks, and concubines. The most illustrious of these 
persons each generated an abundance of anecdotes, some of which occur in more than one text. 
The wording of the anecdotes may differ from text to text, and they may be used for different 
rhetorical purposes in each new context, but the basic events remain the same. Given the 
abundance of anecdotes in early Chinese texts, and their importance in these texts, it seems that 
authors felt compelled to display their knowledge of China’s past and spice up their writings 
with appropriate anecdotes. In this cultural tradition, they kept on referring to some of the same 
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historical figures, and telling some of the same stories involving them, thereby creating what 
could be loosely termed a “corpus” of early Chinese historical anecdotes. The rich and lively 
tradition of drawing on this corpus of historical anecdotes lasted until the end of the Western Han 
Dynasty  (202 BCE-9 CE), and appears to have faded from the Eastern Han Dynasty  
(25–220 CE) onwards, only to make way for new story-telling traditions. It thus seems that as the 
Western Han Dynasty came to an end, so did a long tradition of discussing and arguing through 
that particular corpus of historical anecdotes. At the dawn of the Eastern Han Dynasty, a new 
history was created, with little room for the ancient anecdotes. 
 This chapter analyzes the anecdotes tradition of early China. It contains three parts. Part 1 
is a case study of a single anecdote, which serves as a typical example of the thriving anecdotal 
tradition of early China, from the earliest Chinese narrative histories to the end of the Western 
Han Dynasty. Part 2 continues the case study by analyzing what happened to that single anecdote 
in texts from the Eastern Han Dynasty onwards, thereby illustrating the rapid decline of the 
anecdotes tradition of early China. Part 3 offers tentative explanations for the decline. 
 
Part 1: A Thriving Tradition 
 
The main protagonist of the anecdote that is central to our case study is the illustrious Duke Wen 
of Jin  (r. 636-628 BCE), whose given name was Chong’er  (Double Ears), and who 
was a son of Duke Xian of Jin  (r. 676-651 BCE). In 656 BCE, as Chong’er was in his 
early forties, a conflict over his father’s succession arose when Li Ji , his father’s favorite 
concubine, schemed to have the crown prince replaced by her son. She succeeded through a 
series of intrigues, a tumultuous episode in Jin history known as “the Li Ji Unrest” (Li Ji zhi luan 
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). The upheaval led the original crown prince to commit suicide and forced Duke 
Xian’s other sons, including Chong’er, to flee. With a small group of loyal and able retainers, 
such as Zhao Cui  and Hu Yan , Chong’er traveled from state to state, spending a total 
of nineteen years in exile. In 636 BCE, supported by his retainers and backed by the army of Qin 
, the state where he resided at the time and whose ruler he had befriended, Chong’er returned 
to Jin where he successfully claimed the rulership. Once in power, he implemented major 
reforms that strengthened Jin, and he formed strategic alliances that fortified Jin’s position 
among the other states. Two important events solidified his reign. In 635 BCE, he helped the 
recently ousted King Xiang of Zhou  (r. 651-619 BCE) to regain the throne, and for his 
support he was enfeoffed with Wen , Yuan , and other city-states in the royal domain of the 
Zhou monarchy. In 632 BCE, his army crushed that of Chu  in the epic Battle of Chengpu 
, thereby defeating the only state powerful enough to challenge his hegemony.2 This victory 
effectively made him a “hegemon” (ba ), a ruler who, despite lip service allegiance to the 
house of Zhou above him, reigned supreme as de facto ruler of “all under heaven” (tianxia ), 
or the whole world as known to the Chinese at the time. Following his demise in 628 BCE, 
Chong’er received the posthumous name of Wen , and so he is known to history as Duke Wen 
of Jin.3 
 As with any prominent personality, there is a cornucopia of stories about Duke Wen. In 
this chapter, I shall focus on one anecdote in particular. The anecdote relates an event that 
supposedly took place in the winter of 635 BCE, the year after Duke Wen was installed as the 
new ruler of Jin. In broad strokes, the story goes as follows: Earlier in the year 635 BCE, King 
Xiang bestows the city of Yuan upon Duke Wen, but the inhabitants of Yuan refuse to give Duke 
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Wen their allegiance. Duke Wen’s army thereupon lays siege to Yuan, and he vows to take the 
city within a specified number of days. At the end of that period Yuan still stands, but just as 
Duke Wen is giving up the siege, news arrives that the city will not hold out much longer. Duke 
Wen nevertheless refuses to extend the siege beyond the period that he had promised earlier, for 
it would mean losing his trustworthiness, which is more dear to him than winning Yuan. Hearing 
these noble thoughts, the inhabitants of Yuan readily surrender to him. 
 There are no fewer than six distinct versions of the anecdote in the extant literature from 
early China. In this chapter I present these versions in what may be the chronological order of the 
texts in which they appear. These texts are: Zuozhuan  (Zuo Commentary), Guoyu  
(Discourses of the States), Lüshi chunqiu  (Spring and Autumn Annals of Mr. Lü), Han 
Feizi  (Master Han Fei), Huainanzi  (The Master of Huainan), and Xinxu  
(Newly Arranged [Anecdotes]). Note that for my argument the sequential order of these texts is 
of little relevance, as I am more interested in how the distinct versions of the anecdote are used 
in their relative contexts, than when precisely they were put to writing. 
 
Version 1: Zuozhuan 
 
The Zuozhuan, traditionally attributed to a historian named Zuo Qiuming  (fl. 6th–5th c. 
BCE), is one of the earliest Chinese narrative histories.4 It describes events that took place 
between 722 and 463 BCE. In its current form the text serves as a commentary to the Chunqiu 
 (Spring and Autumn Annals), the influential chronicle compiled in the state of Lu . In the 
Zuozhuan, the following event is associated with the 25th year of the reign of Duke Xi of Lu 
 (r. 659–627 BCE), which corresponds to the year 635 BCE in the Gregorian calendar: 
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In winter, when the Marquis of Jin [i.e. Duke Wen] laid siege to Yuan, he commanded 
[his troops to capture the city with] three days worth of provisions. When [three days 
passed and] Yuan did not surrender, he gave the command to quit the place. A spy then 
emerged [from within Yuan] and exclaimed, “Yuan is about to surrender!” The 
commanding officers of his army entreated their lord to wait for this, but he replied, 
“Trust is the precious jewel of a state. It is what the people rely on. If obtaining Yuan 
means losing my trustworthiness, what would they have to rely on? My loss would be 
greater [than my gain.]” After his troops retreated a mere one day’s march, Yuan 
surrendered. He then removed Guan, the Earl of Yuan, to Ji; made Zhao Cui governor of 




This passage offers a number of specific elements that set this version of the anecdote apart from 
other renderings. To begin, the main protagonist is here referred to both as hou , “marquis,” 
the hereditary title he carried, and as gong , “duke,” but often used in early Chinese texts to 
refer more broadly to a “lord.”7 Other versions of the anecdote, discussed below, exclusively use 
the latter appellation, gong, to refer to him. Also, by providing his troops with provisions for 
three days, Duke Wen here implicitly vows to take Yuan within that period. In other versions, as 
we shall see below, the deadline is set at three, five, seven, or even ten days. Finally, Duke Wen 
 474 
here refers to trustworthiness as “the precious jewel of a state” (guo zhi bao ), an element 
we find in some other versions of the anecdote, but not all. These are fairly trivial variations 
between this version of the anecdote and other versions. More telling differences occur at the 
beginning and end of the passage. 
 In my understanding, the passage consists of three parts: an introductory phrase (“In 
winter”), the anecdote proper, and a closing comment (“He then removed...”). 
 The Zuozhuan introduces the anecdote by noting that the siege of Yuan took place in 
winter, and it is the only text to do so. This is, of course, because the Zuozhuan is a chronicle 
that—much like the Chunqiu to which it is appended as a commentary—presents events 
chronologically. The introductory phrase “in winter” connects this anecdote to anecdotes 
immediately preceding it, which describe events that took place in the spring, summer, and fall 
of the same year. In other words, the mention of the word “winter” puts the encirclement of 
Yuan at its correct place within the sequence of events in the year 635 BCE. 
 The Zuozhuan ends this passage by describing the reshuffling of official positions 
following the surrender of Yuan, and again it is the only text to do so. That the text mentions the 
removal of the earl of Yuan, who at first refused to give allegiance to Duke Wen, is 
understandable even without further context. Other elements are less clear. Who is Zhao Cui? 
Why was he made governor of Yuan? Who is Hu Zhen? Why was he made governor of Wen? 
How is the governor of Wen related to the siege of Yuan? The answers to these questions lie 
elsewhere in the Zuozhuan. In that text, Zhao Cui is repeatedly mentioned as an early follower of 
Duke Wen, whom he accompanied from the very beginning of his exile from Jin. Zhao Cui’s 
governorship of Yuan must be understood as a reward for his many years of loyal service to 
Duke Wen.8 Hu Zhen was a son of Hu Mao , who is also described in the Zuozhuan as one 
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of Duke Wen’s close confidants. Hu Zhen’s governorship is probably also best understood as a 
token of appreciation for loyalty. In all likelihood it is mentioned here because the city of Wen 
was recently bestowed upon Duke Wen by King Xiang, as part of a set of gifts that also included 
the city of Yuan. In sum, the concluding remarks of the passage do make sense, but only within 
the larger context of the Zuozhuan. They firmly link the account of the siege of Yuan to the 
larger narrative on Duke Wen and his retainers in the Zuozhuan. 
 Duke Wen receives exceptional coverage in the Zuozhuan, as evidenced by “the amount 
of attention paid to his early years, to his distinctive physical features, and to the assortment of 
wives that he acquired in the course of his odyssey,” as the translator Burton Watson points out.9 
The Zuozhuan is clearly intrigued by this historical figure. The account of his peaceful seizure of 
Yuan enriches the text’s biographical portrayal of Duke Wen, by narrating an event that occurred 
in his life and calling attention to one of his supposed character traits: trustworthiness. 
 In my understanding, the anecdote serves three main functions in the Zuozhuan: historical, 
biographical, and moral. (1) As a commentary to the Chunqiu, a highly terse text, the Zuozhuan 
fleshes out the concise entries of that text. With a meager seven brief entries, the year 635 BCE 
is only sketchily outlined in the Chunqiu, and so as part of the Zuozhuan commentary, the 
anecdote adds detail to the history of the year that witnessed the siege of Yuan. (2) Within the 
context of the Zuozhuan, a text fascinated with the illustrious Duke Wen, the anecdote adds 
biographical detail to his life. (3) Still, perhaps the most important function of the anecdote is 
moral. As Watson points out, the aim of the Zuozhuan is to edify, and as a result “its lessons are 
overwhelmingly political and moral in nature.”10 This also holds true for lessons involving Duke 
Wen, and the account of the siege of Yuan is no exception. The Zuozhuan generally paints a 
positive picture of Duke Wen, namely that of a ruler whose years in exile made him humble and 
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well-suited to become a hegemon.11 One of his fine qualities was trustworthiness, for which the 
anecdote serves as an apposite example, as it suggests that trustworthiness on the part of the lord 
creates loyalty by the subjects. This moral significance of the anecdote is made explicit 
elsewhere in the Zuozhuan. When Duke Wen was about to mobilize his people for battle, an 
advisor warned him that “the people do not yet understand trustworthiness” (min wei zhi xin 
), and it is said that in response to this Duke Wen “attacked Yuan to show them 
trustworthiness” (fa Yuan yi shi zhi xin ).12 In sum, in the Zuozhuan the anecdote 
serves to highlight the values of trustworthiness and loyalty which ideally bind the lord and his 
people. 
 
Version 2: Guoyu 
 
The Guoyu is another early Chinese narrative history.13 Although the text is demonstrably 
written by several hands, Zuo Qiuming is nevertheless traditionally seen as its author. This is 
because the Guoyu and the Zuozhuan, also ascribed to him, largely overlap in scope and content. 
A major difference between the two texts is that the emphasis in the Guoyu is more on the 
sayings, rather than the doings, of rulers and other dignitaries. Also, the Guoyu organizes 
material per state, and chronologically only within each state. There are one or more chapters 
devoted to each of these states: Zhou , Lu , Qi , Jin , Zheng , Chu , Wu , and 
Yue . Occupying nine chapters out of a total of twenty-one, Jin receives more attention than 
any other state in the Guoyu. In the fourth chapter on Jin, we find this version of the anecdote: 
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When Duke Wen attacked Yuan, he ordered [his troops to capture the city] with three 
days worth of provisions. When three days passed and Yuan did not surrender, the duke 
gave orders to withdraw his army and quit the place. A spy then emerged [from within 
Yuan] and exclaimed, “Yuan will not last more than one or two days!” The commanding 
officers of his army reported this to the duke, who replied, “If obtaining Yuan means I 
will lose my trustworthiness, with what would I lead my people? You see, 
trustworthiness is what the people rely on. It must not be lost.” And so they quit the place, 




There are some minor variations between this version of the anecdote and the one in the 
Zuozhuan quoted above. For starters, this passage contains no more than the anecdote proper: it 
has no phrases at the beginning and end informing the reader that the siege took place in winter 
and that several officials found new jobs after the surrender of Yuan. Also, this passage does not 
refer to trustworthiness as “the precious jewel of a state,” as does the Zuozhuan. Finally, this 
passage does not measure the retreat of Duke Wen’s army as a one day march, but more 
specifically mentions that they had reached the nearby mountain pass of Mengmen  when 
Yuan surrendered.15 
 In the Guoyu, the fourth chapter on the state of Jin consists in its entirety of 
chronologically arranged passages narrating the words and deeds of Duke Wen. The passage 
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immediately preceding the account of the attack on Yuan describes how Duke Wen and his army 
besieged another walled fortification in the spring of 635 BCE, half a year before they encircled 
Yuan. He initially planned to take that fortification by military means, but won the population 
over by his outstanding character—as was the case with Yuan. The passage immediately 
following the siege of Yuan describes how Duke Wen in 632 BCE defeated the state of Chu in 
the famous Battle of Chengpu that effectively made him the most powerful ruler of his day and 
age. 
 In sum, the Guoyu resembles the Zuozhuan in that the purposes of the anecdote are 
historical, biographical, and moral, as both texts place the siege of Yuan in the larger context of 
Duke Wen’s actions and highlight his virtuous conduct. This is hardly surprising because, as 
Kierman notes, “the Chinese chroniclers compiled their record moralistically, narrating battles in 
a way to prove that those who won deserved to do so.”16 
 
Version 3: Lüshi chunqiu 
 
The Lüshi chunqiu is a voluminous and well-organized work compiled around 239 BCE under 
the patronage of Lü Buwei  (d. 235 BCE), chancellor of the state of Qin. The 
encyclopedic text contains three major parts—“Almanacs” (ji ), “Examinations” (lan ), 
“Discussions” (lun )—each subdivided into an apparently auspicious number of books, 
chapters, and sections. Broadly speaking, the Almanacs discuss human activities in 
correspondence with the workings of the seasons, the Examinations focus on governance, and 
the Discussions are somewhat incoherent passages on the exemplary behavior of worthy rulers.17 
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In Book 19 of the Lüshi chunqiu, which is part of the Examinations, we find this version of the 
anecdote: 
 
When Duke Wen of Jin attacked Yuan, he agreed with his officers on a period of seven 
days [to capture the city]. When seven days passed and Yuan did not capitulate, he gave 
the command to quit the place. A collaborating officer then exclaimed, “Yuan is about to 
capitulate.”18 The officers in command of his army entreated the duke to wait for this, but 
he replied, “Trust is the precious jewel of the state. If obtaining Yuan means losing this 
treasure, I will not do it.” Thereupon they quit the place. The next year he again attacked 
Yuan. This time he agreed with his officers that they would return home only after they 
had obtained Yuan. When the inhabitants of Yuan heard about this, they surrendered. 
When the inhabitants of Wei heard about this, they regarded Duke Wen as the epitome of 
trustworthiness and therefore also gave their allegiance to him.19 
 Hence, the saying “obtaining Wei by launching an offensive against Yuan” refers 
to this episode. It is not that Duke Wen did not desire to obtain Yuan. Rather, he thought 
it best not to obtain Yuan if obtaining it meant being untrustworthy. Because he insisted 
on obtaining Yuan through sincere trustworthiness, it was not merely Wei that gave him 






Lü Buwei and his team clearly had a liking for drama. In their version, the deadline for defeating 
Yuan is seven days, not just three. Also, Duke Wen does not retreat a mere one day’s march but 
a full year, only to come back with an emboldened promise the next year. Finally, in this 
rendering of the story Duke Wen does not win just one city, but two, a double victory that 
inspired the early Chinese equivalent of the saying of two birds with one stone. 
 In my understanding, the anecdote proper runs from the opening line “When Duke Wen 
of Jin attacked Yuan” to “also gave their allegiance to him.” The remainder of this passage, from 
“Hence, the saying” to the end, evaluates the anecdote and embeds it within the larger textual 
unit, which is Chapter 6 in Book 19 in the Lüshi chunqiu. Book 19 is “concerned with the 
techniques by which a ruler can ‘employ the people,’ that is, make them willing to die for his 
causes,” as the translators Knoblock and Riegel point out.22 Chapter 6, titled “Using Desire” (wei 
yu ), highlights the importance of desires from the perspective of the ruler. If the people are 
without desires, they will have no incentive to work, making it difficult for the ruler to employ 
them. The more they desire, the easier it will be for the ruler to manipulate them into working for 
him. Now, the anecdote about the siege of Yuan comes at the very end of the chapter. It is related 
to the chapter’s central theme because Duke Wen desired Yuan but not at all costs. He is 
therefore explicitly identified as someone who “knew how to seek what he desired” (zhi qiu yu 
). 
 This is the only anecdotal example in the otherwise essayistic chapter. It is perhaps 
somewhat strange that Lü Buwei and his team selected this particular anecdote. Whereas the 
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chapter focuses on how rulers can make use of the desires of their people, the anecdote shows the 
benefits for rulers if they temper their own desires. Perhaps the idea is that, for the system of 
“using the people’s desires” to work, it is of utmost importance that the ruler himself knows how 
to control his own desires. Duke Wen serves as an apposite example of such a ruler. He desired 
Yuan, but not at all costs, and by patiently displaying his trustworthiness, in the end he 
effortlessly gained even more than what he initially desired. Incidentally, the next chapter in the 
Lüshi chunqiu is titled “Valuing Trustworthiness” (gui xin ), and the anecdote of Duke Wen 
could have easily—and perhaps more appropriately—served as an example there as well. Quite 
possibly the anecdote serves to bridge the two chapters. 
 In the Zuozhuan and the Guoyu, the anecdote forms part of historical narratives—
chronological descriptions of events in the life of Duke Wen, in the state of Jin, and in the year 
635 BCE—but both texts also deploy the anecdote to articulate a didactic message about 
trustworthiness. In the Lüshi chunqiu, by contrast, the anecdote is detached from its historical 
context, and used instead as an example in an expository essay on “using desires” as a specific 
technique of rulership. The emphasis in the Lüshi chunqiu appears to be on knowing how to get 
what one desires, which can easily be misconstrued as an argument in favor of endless greed. It 
is perhaps for this reason that the text specifically adds the quality of “sincere trustworthiness” 
(cheng xin ), as if it wants to make clear that Duke Wen was truly trustworthy and not just 
feigning trustworthiness to gain territory. 
 It seems that the Zuozhuan, Guoyu, and Lüshi chunqiu all use the story to exemplify or 
illustrate an aspect of Duke Wen’s character but they make different claims about what should be 
highlighted about him. The Zuozhuan and the Guoyu emphasize the importance of 
trustworthiness, whereas in the Lüshi chunqiu the moral value of trustworthiness is subordinated 
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to the art of “knowing how to go after what you desire,” which is probably why the text has to 
emphasize that Duke Wen's trustworthiness was sincere. This shows how different didactic 
points might be drawn from the same anecdote. Below we will see how other texts draw their 
didactic points from this anecdote. 
 
Version 4: Han Feizi 
 
The Han Feizi is named after Han Fei  (ca. 280–233 BCE) who, being born into the ruling 
family of the state of Han , was the only early Chinese thinker of noble descent. The text, 
probably largely written by himself, contains essays on law, power, and other aspects of 
statecraft.23 The Han Feizi contains six chapters, all titled “Chushuo”  (Collection of 
Illustrative Examples), in which anecdotes illustrate the point the author is trying to make. In one 
of the chapters, we find this version of the anecdote: 
 
When Duke Wen of Jin launched an offensive against Yuan, he [made his troops] bundle 
ten days of provisions and accordingly agreed with his grandees on a period of ten days 
[to capture the city]. When ten days had passed since their arrival and Yuan did not 
capitulate, he sounded the bells of retreat, put an end to the military operation and quit the 
place. One of his officers then emerged from within Yuan and exclaimed, “In three days, 
Yuan will capitulate!” His entire cabinet and all his confidants remonstrated, saying, 
“Look, Yuan’s food supplies are depleted and their moral is exhausted. Would you not 
wait a little for this?” He replied, “I had agreed with my troops on a period of ten days. If 
we do not quit, I will loose my trustworthiness. If obtaining Yuan means losing my 
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trustworthiness, I will not do it.” Thereupon he put an end to the military operation and 
left. When the inhabitants of Yuan heard this, they said, “How can we not give our 
allegiance to a lord as trustworthy as this one?!” Thereupon they surrendered to the duke. 
When the inhabitants of Wei heard this, they said, “How can we not follow a lord as 
trustworthy as this one?!” Thereupon they surrendered to the duke. 
 When Confucius heard about this, he made the following note, “Trustworthiness 




This reading of the anecdote is more discursive than the ones we saw earlier. Here, Duke Wen’s 
advisors are allowed to explain why they oppose a troop withdrawal, and the inhabitants of Yuan 
and Wei similarly explain their reasons for surrendering to Duke Wen—all in direct speech. 
Similar to the version in the Lüshi chunqiu, this version maintains that the surrender of Yuan was 
followed by the spontaneous surrender of Wei. A major difference between the two versions, 
however, is that the “two cities with one siege” saying, whose origin is not specified in the Lüshi 
chunqiu, is here attributed to Confucius. As Michael Hunter notes, why Confucius “was felt to be 
an appropriate mouthpiece for the one comment but not the other is an open question.”25 
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 The “Chushuo” chapters in the Han Feizi start with a series of political “guidelines” (jing 
) that are explained through what the text calls “illustrative examples” (shuo д). The 
guideline for which the Siege of Yuan anecdote serves as an illustrative example is this: 
 
Once small trust is completed, large trust is established. That is why the enlightened ruler 
gradually builds up trust. If penalties and punishments are not trusted, instructions and 
prohibitions will not be carried out. For illustrative examples, see “Duke Wen’s offensive 




Readers who wish to know about the gradual accumulation of trust, may follow Han Fei’s 
directions and read the anecdotes (further on in the text) about Duke Wen who, having gained 
the trust of Yuan also gained the trust of Wei, and Ji Zheng, who explains how three different 
kinds of trust may prevent starvation among the population. 
 In the Han Feizi, similar to the Lüshi chunqiu discussed above, the anecdote is detached 
from its historical context and used instead to illustrate a political principle. The main difference 
between the two texts is that in the former, the anecdote shows rulers the best way to go after 
what they desire, whereas in the latter it shows how a ruler can gradually accumulate trust. By 
showing the inhabitants of Yuan he is a man of his word, he ensures that both Yuan and Wei 
pledge their allegiance to him—a small act of trust on the part of the ruler inspiring a large act of 
trust on the part of the people, as the “guideline” in the Han Feizi puts it. 
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Version 5: Huainanzi 
 
The Huainanzi is a voluminous work written under the auspices of Liu An  (ca. 179–122 
BCE), the King of Huainan . It was supposedly finalized around 139 BCE, for in that 
year it was presented to Liu An’s nephew, Emperor Wu of the Han Dynasty  (r. 141-87 
BCE). In twenty-one chapters, the Huainanzi discusses a range of topics (cosmology, military, 
and so on), a thorough understanding of which can lead one to become an exemplary ruler.27 In 
one chapter we find this version of the anecdote: 
 
When Duke Wen of Jin attacked Yuan, he agreed with his grandees on a period of three 
days [to capture the city]. When three days passed and Yuan did not surrender, Duke 
Wen gave the command to quit the place. The commanding officers then exclaimed, 
“Yuan will surely surrender in another day or two!” Their lord replied, “When I agreed 
with my grandees on three days, I did not realize Yuan could not be made to capitulate in 
this period. If I do not put an end to this military operation now that the three days are 
over, it would mean obtaining Yuan by losing my trustworthiness. I will not do it.” When 
the inhabitants of Yuan heard about this, they said, “How could we refuse to surrender to 
a lord like this?” They promptly surrendered. When the people of Wen heard about this, 
they also asked to surrender. 
 As Laozi puts it, “Dark, dim, inside it lies the essence. The essence is quite 










This passage occurs in Huainanzi chapter 12, titled “Daoying”  (Responses of the Way). 
The chapter contains over fifty anecdotes, each coupled with one or more sayings attributed to 
Laozi  (trad. 6th c. BCE), the mythical founder of Daoism. The anecdotes relate the abstruse 
teachings of Laozi to the real world. In this particular case, the anecdote of the siege of Yuan 
illustrates teachings that can be found in chapters 21 and 62 of the received Laozi. 
 Chapter 21 of the Laozi contains the following passage that paints a poetic image of the 
Way (dao ), the guiding principle of the universe: 
 
The Way is something elusive and evasive. Evasive, elusive, inside it lies an image. 
Elusive, evasive, inside it lies something substantial. Dark, dim, inside it lies the essence. 





This Laozi passage is almost as unfathomable as the Way itself. Interpretations differ widely. For 
instance, the last word, xin , is variously translated as “evidences” (Chan), “truth” (Cleary), 
“true genuineness” (Lafargue), and “something that can be tested” (Lau). It is this word, which 
also means “trust” or “trustworthiness,” that links the Laozi passage to the Duke Wen anecdote 
in the Huainanzi. By linking the two, Liu An and his team appear to say that by attributing more 
value to “trust” than to military gain, Duke Wen values the very essence of the Way. It is 
therefore no surprise that the inhabitants of Yuan and Wen, upon realizing this, gladly surrender 
to him. 
 Chapter 62 of the Laozi contains a statement that can be translated as “fine words can buy, 
honorable deeds can add people” ( ).32 The last two words of the 
Chinese sentence, jia ren , are often translated as “raise [someone] above others.” In the 
context of the Huainanzi, I would translate these words more literally as “add people” in the 
sense of “attracting people to oneself.” By linking the Laozi statement to the anecdote, Liu An 
and his team present Duke Wen as someone whose fine words bought him honor and whose fine 
deeds caused the people of Yuan and Wen to pledge allegiance to him. 
 In sum, in the Huainanzi the anecdote serves to illustrate the teachings of Laozi, as it 
occurs in a chapter that consists in its entirety of similar combinations of historical anecdotes and 
Laozi quotes.33 
 
Version 6: Xinxu 
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The Xinxu is a collection of anecdotes compiled under the auspices of the imperial librarian Liu 
Xiang  (ca. 79–8 BCE). A prolific writer, Liu Xiang is also responsible for the compilation 
of the Bielu  (Separate Records), Zhanguoce  (Stratagems of the Warring States), 
Shuoyuan  (Garden of Illustrative Examples), Lienüzhuan  (Biographies of 
Exemplary Women), and other texts. The received text of the Xinxu contains 165 anecdotes, 
arranged in ten chapters. The first five chapters all carry the unimaginative title “Zashi”  
(Miscellaneous Affairs). One of these affairs is this version of the anecdote: 
 
When Duke Wen of Jin attacked Yuan, he agreed with his grandees on a period of five 
days [to capture the city]. When five days passed and Yuan did not surrender, Duke Wen 
gave the command to quit the place. His officers then exclaimed, “Yuan will surely 
surrender in another three days; you may want to wait for that.” Their lord replied, “If 
obtaining Yuan means losing my trustworthiness, I will not do it.” When the inhabitants 
of Yuan heard about this, they said, “It is impossible not to surrender to a lord as 
righteous as this.” So they promptly surrendered. When the inhabitants of Wen heard 
about this, they also asked to surrender. Hence, the saying “Wen surrenders by attacking 
Yuan” refers to this episode. Thereupon many regional lords gave their allegiance to him. 
Next, he invaded Cao and attacked Wei, gathered heads of state at Jiantu, and after the 
pact with Wen he crushed the southern state of Chu. He then paid respect to the royal 
house of Zhou, which completed his achievements as a hegemon, making him the second 






The title of the text in which this passage appears, Xinxu, translates as “Newly Arranged 
[Anecdotes].” The stories it contains are not new, but borrowed from earlier texts, edited, and 
placed in a new sequential order. The chapter in which this passage appears is full of anecdotes 
involving a wide range of historical figures. These anecdotes are not arranged chronologically, 
but more or less thematically. Overall, they illustrate how rulers may win over the population by 
their virtue. The anecdote immediately preceding the account of the siege of Yuan describes how 
trustworthiness played a major role in the process by which Duke Huan of Qi  (r. 685-643 
BCE) became a hegemon. In sum, it seems that within this Xinxu chapter, the two anecdotes 
form a mini-cluster that highlights the importance of trustworthiness for a ruler, with two 
powerful hegemons as an example. 
 
This case study analyzed one anecdote in six distinct versions, each with a unique purpose 
depending on the context in which it appears. The anecdote may serve a historical purpose by 
showing what happened in 635 BCE, or by fleshing out the history of the state of Jin. It may 
serve a biographical purpose, by adding detail to the eventful life of Duke Wen. It may also serve 
as a vivid illustration in an essay about getting what one desires, or about the importance of 
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trustworthiness. Finally, when combined with quotations from the Laozi, it may serve to show 
the essence and importance of that foundational scripture. Early Chinese texts readily 
incorporated the account of the Siege of Yuan, and many other anecdotes for that matter, because 
they could be molded to suit a range of rhetorical purposes and hence served as powerful 
building blocks in arguments. Taken together, the anecdotes seem to have constituted a pool of 
material that anyone in those days could—and may even have been expected to—draw upon to 
ornament and illustrate their writings. In fact, one will be hard pressed to find a narrative text 
that does not contain a single anecdote.35 In sum, this pool of anecdotes formed an integral part 
of the intellectual framework of writers and readers in those days, which is why they occur in 
such large numbers, for so many different purposes, in such a wide range of texts. 
 
Part 2: A Fading Tradition 
 
Until the end of the Western Han Dynasty, it was apparently a must in almost any text to draw 
upon the large “corpus” of historical anecdotes, that is, anecdotes about actual historical figures, 
such as Duke Wen of Jin. Soon afterwards, however, the corpus seems to have lost its appeal, as 
the tradition of incorporating these particular anecdotes in texts gradually faded. By way of an 
example, let us return to our case study, the Siege of Yuan, and examine how it is received after 
the end of the Western Han. 
 In the two-thousand years following the fall of the Western Han, only a handful of essays, 
commentaries, and encyclopedias refer to the Siege of Yuan. Here are a few examples: 
 The Shuijingzhu  (Commentary on the Waterways Classic), compiled by Li 
Daoyuan  (d. 527), provides a wealth of information regarding the courses of rivers in 
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China. The commentary to the chapter on the Ji River  explains that one source of this river 
is located north-east of Yuan . The commentary then goes on to say that “It is this city that, 
long ago, surrendered to Duke Wen of Jin when he attacked it with trustworthiness” (
).36 The commentator does not provide the anecdote in full, as 
the authors of texts discussed above did. That said, he is obviously well-informed of Duke Wen’s 
military endeavor, its geographical location, and the moral lesson it teaches, and by briefly and 
casually referring to the anecdote, even without quoting it in full, he obviously expects his 
readers to be familiar with the story as well. 
 The Liuzi xinlun  (Master Liu’s New Discussions), a text that also dates from 
the sixth century, contains a chapter titled “Lüxin”  (Treading on the Topic of 
Trustworthiness). The chapter identifies human activity as the essence of being human, and trust 
as the foundation of all activities. It presents four historical figures as beacons of trustworthiness: 
 
Duke Huan [of Qi] did not violate his pact with Cao Gui; [Duke] Wen of Jin did not 
break his promise when attacking Yuan; Wu Qi did not hold back the reward he promised 
for moving the shafts of his carriage; Marquis [Wen of] Wei did not skip the appointment 




The Siege of Yuan is here part of a series of historical maxims, brief references to episodes in 
history that are narrated in with more detail in the Zuozhuan, Han Feizi, Zhanguoce, and other 
 492 
early Chinese texts. The casual references require knowledge of the historical events to be fully 
appreciated as examples of trustworthiness. This passage in Liuzi xinlun obviously expects its 
audience to possess this historical knowledge, which suggests that at the time the Siege of Yuan 
was well-known. 
 The Zizhi tongjian  (Comprehensive Mirror in Aid of Governance), compiled 
and published in 1084 under the leadership of the historian Sima Guang  (1019–1086), is 
a chronological narrative of the history of China. To one historical event Sima Guang adds a 
comment in which he dilates on trustworthiness, a quality he familiarly refers to as “the greatest 
precious jewel of the people’s lord” ( ). Using the same four historical examples of 
trustworthiness as the Liuzi xinlun, he notes that “Duke Wen of Jin did not covet the gains of an 
attack on Yuan” ( ).38 
 The Taiping yulan  (Imperial Readings of the Taiping Era), a voluminous 
encyclopedia created under the auspices of Li Fang  (925–996), quotes line for line the 
Siege of Yuan version as it occurs in the Lüshi chunqiu, including the comment that Duke Wen 
was a man who “knew how to seek what he desired.”39 Whereas the Lüshi chunqiu passage 
serves as an example of “using desires,” the Taiping yulan incorporates the passage in a chapter 
on trustworthiness. 
 The Kongzi jiyu  (Collected Sayings of Confucius), compiled by Sun Xingyan 
 (1753-1818), collects sayings ascribed to Confucius. It includes the Siege of Yuan 
anecdote in the version of the Han Feizi, which as we have seen attributes the saying “obtaining 
Wei by attacking Yuan” to Confucius. 
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 These examples suffice to show that after the Western Han Dynasty, texts either briefly 
referred to the Siege of Yuan, expecting readers to be familiar with the historical event and its 
moral lesson, or they quote in full one of the earlier versions of the anecdote, including any 
comment the earlier authors attached to the anecdote. What authors after the Western Han do not 
do, however, is create new versions of the anecdote and embed these as illustrative examples in 
their essays. In other words, to authors from the Eastern Han onwards, the Siege of Yuan may 
still be known, and what it signifies (the importance of trustworthiness) may still be understood, 
but the anecdote itself is no longer actively used. 
 This case study of just one anecdote is suggestive of a much broader trend. Until the end 
of the Western Han, writers strongly felt a need to draw upon a corpus of historical anecdotes to 
strengthen their arguments by molding the anecdotes in certain ways. From the beginning of the 
Eastern Han, we no longer see that strong urge in the surviving literature, even though some 
authors still referred—often through brief maxims—to some of the more famous early Chinese 
historical anecdotes. 
 
Part 3: Musings on the End of a Tradition 
 
Why did the corpus of early Chinese anecdotes lose its appeal? Why did authors grow less 
inclined to draw from the pool of early Chinese anecdotes to reinforce their writings? It is not 
easy to pinpoint the cause of the decline of tradition, and there might not even be one single 
cause for the decline. More likely, several concurrent trends combined to bring about the decline. 
Here are my musings on several of those trends. 
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 If we wish to find out why the early Chinese anecdotes lost their appeal, we should ask 
ourselves what caused their appeal in the first place. After all, it is quite remarkable that writers 
over a span of several centuries, from the Warring States to the Han, and in various literary 
genres, mention some of the same historical figures and draw upon the same pool of anecdotes 
for their writings. It seems that these historical figures, and the events they were involved in, and 
the lessons to be learned from those events, were part of the intellectual framework of the literate 
classes in early China. When expressing their thoughts in writing, authors reinforced the very 
framework from within they wrote. This self-perpetuating system among the cultural elites of 
early China not only led scholars to sprinkle their writings with anecdotes, but also to create 
entire collections of anecdotes. The most prominent person in this regard is the prodigious 
imperial librarian Liu Xiang, who lived at the end of the Western Han and was responsible for 
several influential collections of anecdotes. For example, he is said to have compiled the Xinxu, 
Shuoyuan, Zhanguoce, and Lienüzhuan. With all these collections of anecdotes occurring around 
the same time, mainly through the efforts of one man, it is hard to imagine how that achievement 
could be topped. Of course, one could rearrange the anecdotes in yet another collection, but that 
would add little new to what had already been done so many times before. So it seems that by the 
end of the Western Han Dynasty, the intensive usage of anecdotes had reached its natural peak, 
and that the massive interest in anecdotes by Liu Xiang and his peers paradoxically also led to 
the decline of the tradition, as there was little new that could be done with the old stories. 
 Little over a decade after Liu Xiang passed away, Wang Mang  (45 BCE–23 CE) 
seized the throne and founded a new dynasty. It was short-lived and followed by what is 
generally termed the “restoration” of the Han dynasty. Traditional historiography divides the 
Han dynasty in two, with Wang Mang’s interregnum as an uncomfortable anomaly in between. 
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Still, his aptly named Xin  (“New”) Dynasty was a something of a watershed in Chinese 
history. For one thing, it enabled scholars to take a critical look at their tradition, and see where it 
had gone wrong. To be sure, earlier scholars had also viewed history with a critical eye. As 
David Schaberg notes: 
 
Only with Sima Qian does a theme of historical verification become at all prominent, and 
even his Shiji includes much anecdotal material that is acknowledged to be unverifiable, 
legendary, and useful more for its lessons than for its historical truth.40 
 
The same could be said for some of the scholars who lived after Liu Xiang. They, too, 
appreciated the early Chinese anecdotes more for the lessons that can be drawn from them, than 
for their historical truth. 
 One of the first truly critical minds is Wang Chong  (27–100 CE), who lived right 
after the Xin at the beginning of the Eastern Han. Tradition has it that he was born into a family 
of humble origins, and that he enjoyed reading books in bookstalls in the capital city, with no 
financial means to actually buy the books he read. As an autodidact, Wang Chong grew out to 
become one of the most critical thinkers of his time. He was highly skeptical of many beliefs, 
theories, and practices of his contemporaries. In his Lunheng  (Balanced Discourses), a 
voluminous book completed around 50 CE, anecdotes play a significantly less prominent role 
than in the texts produced in previous centuries. For example, although his book consists of more 
than 200,000 words, Wang Chong mentions the Siege of Yuan not even once, and Duke Wen 
only twice.41 By contrast, the Huainanzi, which was compiled almost two centuries earlier and is 
half the Lunheng in size, does mention the Siege of Yuan anecdote and it brings up Duke Wen in 
 496 
no fewer than seven chapters. Similarly, the Lüshi chunqiu, compiled almost three centuries 
before the Lunheng and also roughly half its size, likewise contains the Siege of Yuan anecdote 
and it mentions Duke Wen over a dozen times. Duke Wen clearly does not hold the same appeal 
for Wang Chong as he did for Lü Buwei and Liu An. Other historical figures can count on Wang 
Chong’s attention, but he views the anecdotes that involve them with a critical eye. For example, 
Duke Huan of Qi, the first of the so-called “hegemons,” is said to have married his seven cousins, 
which would have been a major faux pas even in early China—that is, if it were true. Wang 
Chong for one does not think it was true. In a chapter titled “Shuxu”  (Falsehoods in Books), 
we find this passage: 
 
It has been recorded that Duke Huan of Qi married his seven cousins. That cannot be true, 
for it would be incest and a violation of the laws of consanguinity. [...] Had Duke Huan 
married his seven cousins, his viciousness would have left behind that of [the tyrants] Jie 
and Zhòu. [...] The Chunqiu commends the smallest merit and condemns the slightest 
wrong. For what reason then did it not condemn the great crime of Duke Huan? [...] Why 
was the Chunqiu so hard upon Duke Xiang, recording his lewdness, and why so lenient to 
Duke Huan, concealing his crime and having no word of reproof for it? [...] The fault of 
Duke Huan consisted in his too great condescension towards the ladies of his harem. Six 
concubines enjoyed his special favor, and five princes contended to become his heirs. [...] 
People hearing of these six favorites, and that no distinction was made between the sons 










Wang Chong is one of the first persons to treat anecdotes about historical figures with a grain of 
salt. As Shilling and Ptak point out in their study of stories involving Duke Huan, Wang Chong 
rectifies some crazy stories and “admonishes the reader to be critical with literary works.”44 
What we are witnessing here with Wang Chong is the beginning of a critical look at the 
historical veracity of anecdotes. Up to that point this was hardly the case, as Schaberg points out: 
 
Historicity mattered to the users of anecdotes, but as a complement to rhetorical aims 
rather than as a goal in its own right. The details of events often drifted and changed as an 
anecdote was retold over the centuries, and there is little to suggest that discrepancies of 
this kind troubled Warring States and early Han writers. Facts were not entirely open to 
manipulation, but it is significant that, in all the debates of the era, writers so rarely saw 
fit to question the details of each other’s accounts.45 
 
Wang Chong is one of the first to question the details of earlier accounts. And once the details 
are being questioned, the account itself loses some of its authority, and hence some of its appeal. 
This is not to say that people stopped producing anecdotes or that people lost interest in history, 
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but the large corpus of early Chinese anecdotes that includes the account of the Siege of Yuan 




The point of this chapter is not to argue that authors from the Eastern Han onwards no longer 
used anecdotes in their writings, or even that the specific corpus of early Chinese historical 
anecdotes fell into oblivion after the Western Han. To the contrary, we often find brief references 
to early Chinese historical anecdotes in later texts, which suggests that to the authors and their 
readers the stories were still known and relevant. I merely want to point out that the intensive and 
almost compulsory use of a specific set of anecdotes—a tradition that led no fewer than six texts 
to include a variant of the Siege of Yuan story—until the end of the Western Han, stands in 
marked contrast to the modest use of the corpus after the Western Han. To be sure, anecdotes 
continued to be important, but the fall of the Western Han was the start of a new period that 
created its own anecdotes. The culmination of this process is the Shishuo xinyu  (A 
New Account of the Tales of the World), compiled and edited by Liu Yiqing  (403-444), 
which contains over a thousand anecdotes about historical figures from the Han Dynasty and 
beyond. It seems that by that time, anecdotes about earlier Chinese historical figures had gone 
past their expiration date. 
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